Youth, Protest and Power: Emerging Global Narratives in Human Rights Advocacy

EndFemicide January Solidarity 2024 Rally Photo Courtesy: Amnesty International Kenya

Youth led mass protests are significantly challenging state legitimacy in Bangladesh, Nigeria and Kenya. Driven by deep economic distress, hopelessness and impunity, these nations lurch between constitutionalism, authoritarianism and anarchy with consequences for billions of people. What new human rights narratives and forms of organizing are emerging from these Gen Z social movements, human rights organisations and governments?[1]

State of youth and street, policy and online activism globally

The world’s most respected CSO global alliance CIVICUS 2024 State of Civil Society was depressing reading.[2] Conflict and repression is rising globally. Fuelled by violence in Sudan, Ukraine and Gaza, civilian casualties are up 62 per cent from 2023. 114 million people are internally displaced and on the run. 72 per cent of the world’s people now live under authoritarian and increasingly unstable, political systems.

118 countries actively restrict free association, expression and assembly. The rights of women, non-binary persons, refugees and poor people are being directly attacked. Laws that have provided protection up to now are being challenged in courts. New anti-organised crime laws are being used to silence leaders and organisations demanding better climate governance, an end to corruption and human rights abuses.

Unsurprisingly given the historical role of young people in the American civil rights, African and Asian national independence and European climate change movements, students and the youth were in the forefront of mass protest uprisings in Bangladesh, Nigeria, Kenya and elsewhere in 2024.[3]

Their recent courage and creativity are generating new human rights narratives and forms of organizing that citizens, civic organisations, political parties and governments ignore at their peril. They are also breathing life to the right to free expression, association and assembly.

Youth rebellions and their global significance: A tale of three countries

Most Kenyans, Nigerians and Bangladeshi are between 17 and 27 years of age. In 2024, young people took to the streets across all three countries in a series of multiple-locational protests against mis- governance, corruption and the cost of living. According to ACLED, there were over 1,800 demonstrations or 4 demonstrations every day in Kenya over 2024.[4] The trigger for the most intense period was the attempt to pass a widely unpopular finance bill that contained several punitive taxes. The tension culminated in the temporary occupation of the National Assembly, attacks on the Supreme Court buildings and County Government offices on 25 June.

Between 1-10 August, several “days of rage” were organised under the banner of #EndBadGovernanceInNigeria. At their height, protests took place in 29 out of 36 states and the federal capital of Nigeria.[5] There were no less than 358 protests in Bangladesh or nearly 6 protests every day over June and July 2024.[6] The Bangladeshi student uprising began as a response to the reinstatement of a quota-based system for descendants of freedom fighters for governments by a High Court. Following the unlawful and illegal crackdowns of university students and civilians in July by state and non-state actors aligned with the government, students and the public took to the streets in solidarity.

All three mass mobilisations therefore were designed to reverse government economic policies and reforms. In both Nigeria and Kenyan women were very active, organising separately or with men to mobilise young people online or onto the streets. They were met with force from their national police, army and security services. In the case of Bangladesh, the ruling Awami League party mobilised counter protesters from among their student wing, the Chhatra League.

Human rights organisations have verified at least 22 protesters were killed in Nigeria[7], 65 in Kenya and 1,400 in Bangladesh[8] with tens of thousands of people injured and arrested. The deployment of counter protesters in the case of Bangladesh, increased the levels of violence, injuries and deaths with as many as 13 per cent of them, child deaths.

Notwithstanding these challenges, it is undeniable that the courage and creativity of young people across the three countries have generated new human rights narratives and forms of organizing that citizens, civic organisations, political parties and governments ignore at their peril.

Emerging new human rights organizing and narratives governments and political parties need to internalize

The first lesson from 2024 is that young people prefer informal to formal political engagement. Not commissions or policy dialogues but street-based protests and direct action. The failure of democratic open societies to deliver dividends to an economically insecure, politically marginalised and socially divided populations has produced a profound dissatisfaction with formal public institutionalised politics. Hundreds of thousands of young people repeatedly risked being hurt or killed to publicly demonstrate across 44 of Kenya’s 47 counties in 2024. Yet, barely two years earlier, 6 million 18-24-year-olds eligible to vote didn’t go to the polls.[9]

Inuka Kenya Ni Sisi’s 2023 report is a helpful starting point for understanding the recent rebellion against the Kenya National Assembly and the Kenya Kwanza national administration. The study found that while most young people know democracy is based on public participation, nearly four out of five young Kenyans did not engage in any political activity apart from voting.

This reality is a tremendous opportunity for political parties if they are prepared to give up ways of being that have repelled young citizens to date. For this demographic, the commercialisation of politics has been a major repellent to authentic participation. Large rallies can be generated by handouts and allowances but as soon as these are removed, these “casual activist workers” transfer their services to the next politician. The exodus of young people from political participation has also been fuelled by the consistent pattern of defunding continuous voter registration, voter and civic education. Without this, young people have lacked engaged understanding of political decision-making, how democratic institutions work and how to influence important policy instruments such as budgets and bills.

The younger citizens are, the less interested they have been in political activities. Politics is either too boring, expensive or ethnically divisive, toxic and violent. A very small number of young people are affiliated to or even interested in joining any political party controlled by a single benefactor or small group of older politicians. Most political parties do not have youth wings that are actively recruited, educating and retaining young people outside the pre-election campaigns.

Both states and spectators have speculated on the extent that the three uprisings were sponsored or supported by foreign states. In the case of Nigeria, the Russian flag was hoisted by a small number of protesters before they were arrested.[10] In Kenya, there were unproven suspicions that Russian troll farms had boosted the Gen Z movement’s hashtags.[11] Rather than amplifying the demands of young citizens, the United Nations, American and European states appear to have privately messaged and publicly called for Tinabu, Hasina and Ruto to exercise restraint, uphold human rights and dialogue with the protest movement.

All three movements were homegrown, therefore. Expensive, unfair and exclusionary political systems drove the recent political crises. Politically crowded out, without a voice and unheard, young people found new ways outside of the traditional and legal avenues for self-expression and civic influence. The issues that preoccupy young people in Kenya, Nigeria and Bangladesh were also clear. Most are preoccupied with their safety, employment and corruption, themes that surfaced and drove the recent protests across all three countries

Current political and policy channels for public participation have systemically failed this generation. New approaches by governments are needed. Both elected and appointed state officers must look beyond tired old tokenistic offers of affirmative seats, youth wing side shows and one way communication channels. New ways of engaging young people where they are rather than where the powerful and privileged are comfortable are now needed.

This population is highly digital, visual, and rightfully, highly suspicious of anyone who appears to be benefiting from corruption or privilege. Public relations, the art of spinning what you think others want to hear, only infuriates and undermines any perceived benefit. Only respect and regular listening to youth led organisations will restore a basis for trust between state officers and young people.

The second lesson is that young people are very capable of combining online and offline activism using low-cost, wide-reaching mass based digital technologies and platforms.[12] In varying degrees, the three mass uprisings were led by digitally savvy and very clear politically, economically and socially activists. Rather than single issue campaigns, the movements found ways of shifting and broadening their focus. In Kenya, the Gen Z movement shifted the focus, one hashtag at a time. What started out as #RejectFinanceBill2024 shifted to #OccupyParliament and finally became a call for President #RutoMustGo

The third lesson is that while offline protest action can be violent and online activism can be toxic, young people have largely chosen peaceful ways to protest injustice, demand accountability and democratic governance. Demonstrations were reportedly peaceful until security services in all three countries used excessive force against the protesters or attempted to unlawfully stop them from demonstrating.

In all three countries, the authorities were unable to de-escalate the protests leading to the deployment of the army. Kenyan protesters faced a separate distinct challenge. The authorities repeatedly used abductions or enforced disappearances rather than arrests and prosecution of online or offline protesters.[13]

Over several months, more than 89 mostly young people were abducted, detained and tortured by state agencies trained in counterintelligence and counter-terrorism methods for leading peaceful protests, expressing a political conscience or posting images of the President online.[14] The abductees were only released after sustained online campaigns, media work and habeas corpus applications by citizens, civic and political leaders and the Law Society of Kenya in Kenyan courts.[15]

While the systematic use of excessive and disproportionate use of force may have created a chilling effect for many who were willing to organise public protests, youth anger remains. While the abductions may have restricted the freedom of online expression for some, it is also clear that the social media platforms continue to be vibrant spaces for political opposition, accountability and awareness-raising in early 2025.

Inter-generational public outrage against state violence drove support for the youth organisers across all three countries. In Bangladesh, by the time the Government had conceded to the quota reform demands, the movement had moved to call for the resignation of then Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina, the Cabinet and Supreme Court. On 5 August, Prime Minister Hasina was forced to flee the country, and an interim government was installed on 8 August.[16]

In Kenya, the President was forced to withdraw the Finance Bill, dissolve his cabinet, accept the resignation of the Police Inspector General and publicly commit to listen and act more on public’s concerns. In Nigeria, curfews were lifted, and several protesters were released but the government resisted any petrol subsidies or cost of living reforms.

Emerging new human rights organizing and narratives human rights organisations need to internalize

Mass grievances with gross inequalities, corruption and impunity were central to the anger in all three countries. With young people now longer able to see the opportunity ladder and bombarded with President Tinubu’s new jet, President Ruto incessant international travel and Prime Minister Hasina’s human rights violations, their patience snapped. While some have taken comfort in the cessation of the protests, their reoccurrence is all but certain in the continued persistence of these grievances.

Secondly, while human rights organisations have been traditionally seen as oppositional forces by Kenyan, Bangladeshi and Nigerian governments, the 2024 rebellions offered a sharp contrast from the traditional policy dialogue, media work and the occasional public demonstration approach of NGOs. They were led in the most part by individuals with no prior national reputation or access to significant foreign funding. They claimed to be tribeless or leaderless and found the capacity to boldly crowd-think, crowd-fund and crowd-organise. Human rights organisations found themselves overtaken by more community-based, multi-locational direct action fuelled by cancel culture.

The three sets of protests also awakened other national actors who acted to protect the right to life, fair trial, free expression, assembly, association and freedom from cruel and inhuman treatment. They included national human rights commissions, medical and legal professional and occupational associations in Kenya[17], Nigeria[18] and Bangladesh.[19] Together with human rights organisations, these associations used their nation-wide reach to monitor protests, provide emergency health care and legal representation, independently carry out postmortems and document deaths and introduce strategic litigation in courts.[20]

Digital activism has become one of the most powerful protest and mobilisation tools. Kenyan protesters used the Zello app to organise the protests, ChatGPT to translate the controversial finance bill into local languages and optimised their public reach by integrating TikTok, FaceBook, X and WhatsApp. Rather than the one-way communication approach of most NGOs, these Gen Z organisers prioritise viral engagement. In response, all three states partially or completely restricted the internet and app access at peak moments.[21]

Another area that needs more study is how protesters can safely learn more effective strategies from other countries and contexts. While local triggers remained central to the rebellions in all three countries, the contagion effect remains important. For example, analysts have drawn links between Palestinian protesters teaching Black Lives Matter protesters to use toothpaste under their eyes to neutralise tear gas and Kenyans protesters doing the same, a decade later.[22] Many Nigerians watched Kenyan demonstrators storm Parliament Building, seize the ceremonial mace to symbolise how power had shifted on June 25 before organising their protests.

While young people’s activism led to the rejection of the Finance Bill in Kenya, regime change in Bangladesh, and police reforms in Nigeria, their participation did not produce more space for youth leadership nor a significant change in their conditions. In several cases, the cost on young people was particularly high.

A common challenge faced by all three youth-based movements has been how to ensure mental resilience and wellbeing in the face of the authoritarian strategies used to systematically repress them. While the movements were guided by clear grievances, agreeing and holding a common vision has been a challenge. In all three cases, the movements have been weakened by fragmentation and ideological differences. Human rights organisations need to develop new ways of responding to mass public collective trauma as well as the specific cases of brutalised protesters.

To keep youth movements a force for accountability, justice and constitutionalism in the face of authoritarianism, human rights organisations need to study Gen Z ways of thinking and organisation. New forms of civic education embedded in popular culture are now needed. Now that young people have realised that they can act and reclaim their power as citizens, there is need to support them.

Conclusion

“Be like water making its way through cracks. Do not be assertive, but adjust to the object, and you shall find a way around or through it. Empty your mind, be formless. Be water, my friend.” - Bruce Lee Jr. (1971)

“A social movement that only moves people is merely a revolt. A movement that changes both people and institutions is a revolution.”

Martin Luther King Jnr. - Why We Can’t Wait (1964)

“We must not mistake calmness for peace and the fact that the youth are no longer in the streets must not be misconstrued to mean all is well. I must reiterate [Kenya] needs steadfast leadership now more than ever” - Law Society of Kenya President Faith Odhiambo (2025)

2024 were constitutional moments for Kenya, Nigeria and Bangladesh. In all three contexts, young people rose to restore constitutional values of leadership integrity, democracy, economic opportunity and equality under the law. Those that courageously and collectively created these moments must resist the temptation to go back to sleep. Only by demanding the overhaul of authoritarian and corrupt state practises, will we honour those martyred by state violence in 2024.

We must demand accountability, justice and compensation for all the fallen and the hurt. We must demand the release of all abductees and an end to all enforced disappearances. However, we must be clear that the over-securitisation of our societies is not the only problem. The surest path out of the Bangladeshi, Nigerian and Kenyan crises is addressing mass economic distress, the loss of public confidence in the state and the violence on our streets.

It is worth paraphrasing Luther King Jnr. famous 1966 quote thus, “And what is it Kenya, Bangladesh and Nigerian governments failed to hear? They failed to hear that the promises of freedom and justice have not been met.”

[1] This paper remains work in progress pending several discussions planned after public lectures to Universities in Kenya and the United States of America over 2025. The author is especially thankful to Benta Moige, Joel Njuguna, Victor Ndede, Isa Sanusi, Rehab Mahamoor, Babu Ram Pant, Lorraine Degruson and Sara MacNeice for their considerations as well as other colleagues from Amnesty International, the Police Reforms Working Group, Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, the Law Society of Kenya and several others who acted to protect protesters over 2023-2024. Written by an active player in several of the moments it reviews, the author apologises in advance for any blind spots in the analysis and takes responsibility for the arguments it advances. Photo acknowledgment: Monicah Mwangi/Reuters

[2] https://www.civicus.org/index.php/state-of-civil-society-report-2024

[3] https://carnegieendowment.org/emissary/2024/12/election-antigovernment-gaza-global-protest-tracker-2024?lang=en and https://carnegieendowment.org/features/global-protest-tracker?lang=en

[4] https://acleddata.com/2024/12/12/despite-a-crackdown-on-gen-z-demonstrations-dissent-persists-in-kenya/

[5] The Nigerian Cleen Foundation protest observation reports can be found here https://cleen.org/national-protest-report/

[6] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/longform/2024/8/7/how-bangladeshs-gen-z-protests-brought-down-pm-sheikh-hasina

[7] https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr44/8780/2024/en/

[8] https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/02/bangladesh-un-report-finds-brutal-systematic-repression-protests-calls

[9] https://kenyanyouthtrends.shujaazinc.com/governance-and-community

[10] https://theconversation.com/russian-flags-waved-during-nigeria-protests-why-its-a-cause-for-concern-236611

[11] Private conversations with security analysts, 2024

[12] The UNICEF framework for understanding children and youth in protests is helpful https://www.unicef.org/innocenti/media/7761/file/UNICEF-Innocenti-Youth-Protests-and-the-Polycrisis-%20report.pdf

[13] https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/11/06/kenya-security-forces-abducted-killed-protesters